

Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe

National Identity
and Support
for European Integration

Best.-Nr. SP IV 2003-202

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung **Demokratie:**
Strukturen, Leistungsprofil und Herausforderungen
des Forschungsschwerpunkts Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte
und Demokratie

ISSN 1612-1899

Berlin, July 2003

Zitierweise:

Marks, Gary, and Liesbet Hooghe, 2003:
National Identity and Support for European Integration.
Discussion Paper SP IV 2003-202.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Abstract

This paper takes up the familiar question of how one can explain support for European integration. One line of explanation builds on trade theory to theorize a calculus of economic costs and benefits. A second explanation draws on cognitive and social psychology to assess how individuals use political cues—grounded in ideology or elite communication—as a guide to complex issues. A third line draws on the psychology of group membership to consider how group identities, above all, national identities, bear on support for European integration. We use multi-level analysis to evaluate these explanations, and we conclude that perceptions of national identity are by far most powerful in structuring views on European integration. We find that the particular perception of national identity matters, as well as how identity is mobilized in national contexts. Thus, while strong national identity is consistent with support for European integration, *exclusive* national identity is a powerful brake on support. The effect of exclusive national identity varies across countries. It is strongest in countries where referenda on European integration have taken place. Referenda exacerbate conflicts within and among elites and empower single-issue anti-European protest movements, and this mobilizes exclusive national identity in an anti-European direction.

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der bekannten Frage, wie sich die Unterstützung für die europäische Integration erklären lässt. Ein Erklärungsstrang stützt sich auf die Handelstheorie und zieht theoretische Schlüsse aus einer wirtschaftlichen Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse. Ein anderer Erklärungsansatz basiert auf der kognitiven Psychologie und der Sozialpsychologie und untersucht, wie sich Individuen in komplexen Themenfeldern an politischen Voreinstellungen orientieren, die sie aus Weltanschauungen oder Elitendiskursen gewinnen. Ein dritter Ansatz geht von der Gruppenpsychologie aus und fragt danach, wie sich Gruppenidentitäten, vor allem nationale Identitäten, auf die Unterstützung für die europäische Integration auswirken. Wir evaluieren diese Erklärungsansätze mit Hilfe der Mehrebenenanalyse und kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von nationaler Identität mit Abstand die stärkste Auswirkung auf Einstellungen zur europäischen Integration haben. Die individuelle Auffassung von nationaler Identität spielt dabei genau so eine Rolle wie die Bedeutung, die nationaler Identität im nationalen Kontext beigemessen wird. Während eine starke nationale Identität mit der Unterstützung der Europäischen Union einher geht, wirkt sich eine *ausschließlich nationale* Identität stark bremsend auf die Unterstützung aus. Der Einfluss ausschließlich nationaler Identität variiert von Land zu Land. Am stärksten ist er in den Ländern ausgeprägt, in denen Referenden zur europäischen Integration stattgefunden haben. Referenden verschärfen Konflikte innerhalb der und zwischen den Eliten und stärken monothematische, anti-europäische Protestbewegungen. Das wiederum mobilisiert ausschließlich nationale Identitätsgefühle, die sich gegen die europäische Integration richten.

National Identity and Support for European Integration

How can one explain support for European integration? The question is as old as the European Union, and it has been the subject of some one hundred articles, yet there is no scholarly consensus on the answer. One line of explanation builds on trade theory to theorize a calculus of economic costs and benefits. The presumption is that citizens are able to rationally evaluate the economic consequences of European integration for themselves and for the groups of which they are part, and that such consequences drive their attitudes. A second explanation draws on cognitive and social psychology to assess how individuals use political cues—grounded in ideology or in elite communication—as a short-hand guide to new and complex issues. A third line of explanation draws on the psychology of group membership and emotional attachment to consider how group identities and, above all, national identities, bear on support for European integration.

Each line of explanation conceives of the object of attitude formation—the European Union—differently. The political-economic approach views the European Union as a regime that facilitates economic exchange, with profound distributional consequences arising among individuals from differences in asset mobility and among countries from institutional differences. The political cue approach views the European Union as an extension of domestic politics, and seeks explanations of public attitudes in domestic ideology or domestic political institutions, above all, national political parties. The national identity approach conceives of the European Union as a polity overarching established communities, and considers how this interacts with citizens' conceptions of their identity.

We find support for each of these lines of explanation, but we conclude that the latter is by far the most potent. Conceptions of in-groups and out-groups are immensely powerful in explaining public opinion on European integration. Rational evaluation of costs and benefits figure in our explanation, but they take second place after group attachments. European integration seems to provoke emotional responses on the part of citizens that engage communal identities. But such identities are not objective. Rather they are debated, contested, and constructed in national contexts.

We proceed by stages. In the next section we summarize the main lines of theorizing and the models that have been put forward to account for public opinion on European integra-

* The names of the authors are in random order.

tion. In the following sections we operationalize key variables, and evaluate their statistical power in a multi-level analysis.

Multi-level analysis is particularly appropriate for the questions we are asking. It is well suited to probing contextual effects in a multi-level polity. The core idea of multi-level governance is that public decision making is diffused across multiple territorial levels or contexts. Multi-level modeling allows an intimate dialog between theory and evidence in explaining the effects of such contexts. In this paper we consider public opinion on European integration as an interaction between individual-level attributes and the national and party-political contexts in which they are mobilized. To predict individual attitudes, we must therefore generalize about the contexts in which they are shaped.

1. Theorizing Support for European Integration

Political Economy

The main thrust of European integration has been to sweep away barriers to economic exchange, facilitate mobility of capital and labor, and create a single European monetary authority. It is not surprising, therefore, that explanations of support for European integration have focused, above all, on subjective and objective economic factors at the individual and national level.

There are many ways to hypothesize the economic effects of market liberalization, and yet more ways to build interactive terms to capture these effects. But there is a common, core expectation that, in general, market liberalization favors those with higher levels of income, education, and occupational skill (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Inglehart 1970a; McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). There are several reasons for this. Market liberalization rewards those who have high levels of human capital and penalizes those with low levels of human capital (Becker 1976; Gabel 1998a, 43). Market liberalization increases the international substitutability of labor and consequently intensifies job insecurity, particularly for less skilled workers (Rodrik 1997). Market liberalization puts pressure on the viability of welfare systems (Huber and Stephens 2001; Scharpf 2000; Streeck 1996). And finally, market liberalization shifts the burden of taxation from mobile factors of production that have the option to exit the tax regime to immobile factors that do not (Scharpf 2000).

Theories of support for European integration based on rational calculation of objective economic costs and benefits at the individual level have been extended in two directions. First, *subjective* evaluations, as well as *objective* factors, can be taken into account. Sec-

ond, *sociotropic* evaluations concerning one's group (in this case, nation), can be theorized alongside *egocentric* evaluations. The corresponding four lines of theorizing are represented in the cells of Figure 1.

Figure 1: Political-economic Effects

	objective	subjective
egocentric	1	2
sociotropic	4	3

Positive egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of economic well-being (cells 2 and 3 in Figure 1) are hypothesized to increase support for European integration (e.g. Anderson 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, 510). The rationale for this is that European integration profoundly affects economic life chances, both for individuals and for countries, and is perceived to do so. Citizens who feel confident about the economic future—personally and for their country—are therefore likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while those who are pessimistic or fearful are likely to be euroskeptical.¹

A fourth stream of theorizing hypothesizes that citizens respond sociotropically to objective economic conditions (cell 4). That is to say, citizens are sensitive to their collective economic circumstances, as well as to those that affect them individually. We hypothesize that citizens in countries that are net recipients of European Union spending will be inclined to support, while those in donor countries will oppose European integration (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming).

Recent theorizing on the topic goes further, building on the types of capitalism literature to hypothesize how distinctive political-economic institutions frame the effects of European integration within a member state, and hence the response of its citizens (Ray forthcoming; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming). Each type—market-liberal capitalism, the Rhine model, and the social democratic model—is composed of mutually reinforcing labor market, corporate governance, and welfare institutions. The costs of change for any

1 The connection between subjective economic evaluations and attitudes towards European integration is likely to be all the more apparent to respondents because they are measured in the same Eurobarometer survey. However this effect is limited for the measures of subjective economic evaluations that we use in this article because they are drawn from questions that are asked prior to questions concerning European integration or support for European integration.

model in any one of these areas are large because these institutions are complementary (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Gingerich 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). Each type is the result of deep-seated historical conflicts, and the resultant institutions are embedded, both horizontally, in relation to other institutions, and vertically, in the expectations of those working within them. However, these models have not been equally influential in the process of European integration. The Rhine model, by virtue of the fact that it is the home model of the core countries in the European Community, and that it stakes out a middle ground between the weak redistribution of the liberal model and the strong redistribution of the social democratic model, has been the most influential.² We therefore hypothesize that citizens in countries with the alternative types of capitalism—i.e. the liberal and social democratic types—will be less supportive of European integration.

Political-economic models assume that citizens are well-informed about the economic consequences of alternative institutional arrangements (McLaren 2002). Given the lack of even rudimentary knowledge of the EU on the part of many, even most, citizens (Anderson 1998; Wessels 1995a), we need to explore further to find the sources of their support or opposition. In the next section, we examine political cues, which frame how citizens regard European integration, and in the following section we examine how support for European integration depends on basic identities.

Political Cues

Cognitive and social psychologists have shown that human capacity for calculation is far more limited than utilitarian models presume (Chong 2000; Kinder 1998; Simon 1985). This has directed attention to cognitive short-cuts and emotive anchors that provide essential and *prior* cues that help a person decide what is in his or her interest. Extending pre-existing values or identities to new objects can be understood as rationalist aids to cognition and as the expression of a psychological need for consistency (Conover and Feldman 1984; Feld and Grofman 1988; Feldman 1988; George 1979; Jennings 1992; Sears 1993; Sears and Funk 1991).

2 This is consistent with the median voter theorem. Of course, the outcomes in question are contested (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Several areas of economic integration have been characterized by “negative integration” biased towards the removing of barriers and the introduction of market competition – akin to the liberal model (Scharpf 1999). A weaker version of our argument would be that citizens, including those in countries with liberal or social democratic types of capitalism, *perceive* that their institutions are peripheral, and respond to European integration accordingly.

The cues that appear most relevant to European integration arise in the *domestic* arenas of EU member states, from political ideology and from political parties. The European Union has evolved into an encompassing political community, which is present in all areas of life that governments usually care to regulate. From capital flows to agriculture, transportation, monetary policy, regional policy, environment, social regulation, education, and more recently, defense, immigration, and law and order, national governments share authority with the European Union. Deepening has gone hand in hand with the creation of a system of multi-level governance in which domestic groups, including national political parties, are involved in EU decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 1999). As European politics has become intertwined with domestic politics, it is worth looking to domestic politics to explain public opinion.

Political choices in European domestic politics are structured by a left/right dimension tapping contestation concerning economic equality vs. economic freedom and the role of the state in regulating social and market outcomes. This dimension of contestation serves as a set of cues for taking positions on a range of subjects about which one is likely to have limited knowledge. Does left/right structure opinion on European integration (Gabel and Anderson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen forthcoming; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996)?

For public opinion in the aggregate, the answer appears to be no. There is no robust linear association between citizens' left/right ideology and their position on European integration. But aggregate findings may hide a multitude of sins—or causal patterns—and we need to take up the suggestion of Leonard Ray and Brinegar et al., who argue that the connection between left/right ideology and support for European integration depends on the national context (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming; Marks forthcoming; Ray forthcoming). Their insight derives, once again, from the varieties of capitalism literature. If EU outcomes reflect the preferences of the median member state, then citizens in countries with social democratic systems of capitalism can expect to see their encompassing and highly redistributive welfare systems diluted. By the same logic, citizens in liberal capitalist countries can expect to be led in a more redistributive direction. This has obvious and compelling implications for how citizens on the left and right view European integration. In social democratic systems, the left will be opposed to European integration and the right will be supportive. In liberal market systems, the positions of left and right will be reversed.

Political parties also provide cues. Research on political parties finds that the positions they stake out on European integration correspond to those of their supporters (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Wessels 1995b; Carrubba 2001). Steenbergen and Scott (forthcoming) argue that the causality runs mainly from parties to

voters, rather than the reverse, which accords with the perception that the views of individual citizens on European integration do not determine party positioning on this issue.

National Identity

Emotional or “gut” commitments can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects, particularly when other cognitive frames of reference do not transparently apply (Chong 2000; Kinder and Sears 1981). In the words of Lauren McLaren, “Antipathy toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization ... but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures” (2002, 553). The logic of this approach is all the more persuasive because the European Union is not merely an international regime intended to lower barriers to trade, reduce transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining, or reap scale-efficiencies. On the contrary, the EU is a polity in the making, and as such it threatens not only the decisional autonomy of national institutions, but core values of national sovereignty and national identity.

McLaren conceptualizes the consequences of this in terms of the degree to which citizens fear cultural diversity and cultural degradation as a result of European integration. Feelings of xenophobia, even if not directed precisely at foreigners in the EU, can, she hypothesizes, explain individual support or opposition to the EU.

One might also inquire into territorial identity. Diffuse support for the political community—understood as “basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government” (Norris 1999, 10)—has long been hypothesized to be a requisite for a stable national state (Easton 1965; Smith 1992). Does this line of reasoning apply to the European Union?

This line of theorizing is double-edged. First, we would expect that the stronger an individual’s European identity, the greater her support for the European Union (Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides forthcoming; Risse 2002). Second, we would expect that the stronger an individual’s *national* identity, the *weaker* her support for the European Union.

The first expectation is rooted in the literature linking community attachment to support for the political system. While identities are not cast in stone, there is much evidence that they are relatively stable over individual life spans, and so can be meaningfully considered to constrain more malleable preferences over regime support.

The second expectation, by contrast, is contested. On the one hand, it is obvious to anyone who reads the newspapers in Britain or Denmark, that opposition to European integration is often couched as defense of the nation against control from Brussels (on Britain, Usherwood 2002; on Denmark, Buch and Hansen 2002; on the role of the media in fram-

ing EU debates, Semetko, de Vreese, and Peter 2000). Populist right-wing political parties in a growing list of countries, including France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria, tap nationalism and ethnocentrism to reject further integration, and since 1996 such parties have formed the largest reservoir of Euro-skepticism across the European Union (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Several studies find that individuals or countries with higher levels of national identity have lower levels of support for European integration. Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) show this for individuals in relation to a common European currency; Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Deflem and Pampel (1996) use country data to explore national variations. However, until an article by Sean Carey published in 2002, no-one had shown that national identity at the individual level had a significant negative effect on support for European integration.

On the other hand, several writers argue that high levels of national identity are consistent with support for European integration. Marks finds that attachment to one's country is *positively* associated with attachment to the European Union in bivariate analysis (1999; see also Bruter forthcoming, Citrin and Sides forthcoming). Identities to different territorial communities are, in this view, mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive. A person may, for example, have mutually compatible attachments to her city, Cardiff, her country, Wales, alongside Britain and the European Union (Haesly 2001). This is precisely what Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez find for Spain, where "people who identify strongly with Spain or/and their region also identify strongly with Europe. Spaniards have thus developed a sort of hyphenated identity with respect to Europe" (2001, 772). Along similar lines, van Kersbergen (2000) conceives of European allegiance as embedded in national allegiance. Citizens, he argues, identify with the European Union to the extent that they believe it strengthens the capacity of national states to achieve economic welfare and security. While Carey (2002, 402), as noted, finds that national identity reduces support for European integration under controls, he also shows that the effect is small for individuals with high levels of European identity.

One way of resolving these conflicting expectations is to inquire into the conditions under which national identity is politically *mobilized* into nationalism that sustains stark opposition to European integration (Marcussen et al. 1999). In some contexts, national identity may exist alongside, or even reinforce, support for European integration. In others, national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the European Union threatens national institutions, weakens the national community, and undermines national sovereignty (Risse 2001). It is clear that countries vary widely in this respect, and we introduce a dummy variable describing whether or not a country has had a referendum on membership in the EU or on a major EU treaty, to capture the extent to which debate over European integration has been politicized. Such referenda increase the salience of European issues,

and, perhaps more importantly, limit the capacity of political parties and their leaderships to control debate. Unlike general elections, referenda highlight conflicts within, as well as among, political parties. General elections set the stage for the formation of governments—and political parties, especially major political parties, exploit this to demand unity within their ranks. Referenda, by comparison, are unconstrained expressions of preference, with a reputation for spinning out of elite control (Leduc 2001). If this line of thinking is on the right track, one would expect national identity to play to a different tune in countries which have experienced one or more referenda on European integration.

Models

Table 1 summarizes ten explanatory models of public opinion on European integration. The table lists the dependent variables used in these analyses, the most powerful independent variables (in the boxes), the method, and the proportion of the variance explained. These models are, in our view, among the most interesting, influential, or original analyses to have appeared over the past decade. They also represent the major directions in theorizing. Direct comparison of results across these models is complicated because the dependent variable varies, as do the population encompassed in the study, the time point of the data, and the method employed. But some general lessons can be learned.

Most of these models, like the field as a whole, emphasize political-economic variables, notwithstanding that Ronald Inglehart's pioneering work in this field was primarily non-economic (1970a, 1970b). Values and identities are far less prominent, though we have oversampled on this dimension by including Sean Carey's identity model and Lauren McLaren's cultural threat model. The European Union is a moving target, and it is not surprising that analyses of public opinion have changed over time. Up to the mid-1990s and the Maastricht Treaty it was fair to say that the EU was essentially a means to institutionalize market integration, and analyses of public opinion sensibly reflected this. Matthew Gabel's fine book, based on his dissertation, *Interests and European Integration*, from which we draw the 'policy appraisal' and 'national political economy' models, is primarily oriented to economic costs and benefits (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a, 1998b), as is Anderson and Reichert's 'economic benefits model' (1996). Another stream of work has examined cross-national variation in support in terms of aggregate economic factors (e.g. Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Carrubba 1997; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).

In recent years, however, the debate over European integration has engaged culture and identity as elite conflict on the issue has widened and populist right parties have taken up

Table 1a: Public Opinion on European Integration: Key Economic Models

	Gabel and Palmer's economic voting model (1995)	Anderson and Reichert's economic benefits model (1996)	Gabel's policy-appraisal model (1998)	Gabel's national political economy model (1998)	Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt's types of capitalism model (2002)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Membership + unification</i>	<i>Membership</i>	<i>Membership</i>	<i>Membership</i>	<i>Interaction of perceived actual and desired speed</i>
<i>Cognitive factors</i>					
<i>Egocentric economic factors</i>	Occupation, income, education, proximity to border	Occupation ^c , income, education	Occupation ^d , income, education, proximity to border	Human capital ^e , relative wage ^f , occupation	
<i>Sociotropic economic factors</i>	Evaluation of national economy ^a , national benefit ^b	EU trade, budget returns		EU trade	Types of capitalism ⁱ , structural funding
<i>Political factors</i>				Political stability ^g	Party cue
<i>Ideology/political values</i>		Post-materialism			Values ^j , left/right self-placement
<i>Cultural threat</i>					
<i>Identity</i>					
<i>Other</i>		Length of membership, age, gender	Gender, age	Geopolitical security ^h	
<i>Country dummies</i>	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
<i>Method</i>	OLS pooled time series	OLS over different years	OLS pooled time series	OLS pooled time series	OLS
<i>R²</i>	.38 (EU)	.04-.10 (EU)	.13-.14 (EU)	.11-.13 (EU)	.17 (EU)

a Measured by retrospective evaluation: weak effect.

b Measured by benefit question: strong effect.

c Occupation is a dummy for farmer.

d Dummies: farmer, professional, manual worker.

e Interaction of occupational category and personal income.

f Relative to EU wage by occupation.

g Voters of parties opposing democratic capitalism.

h War deaths in WWII.

i Items tapping wage bargaining system, labor market regime, welfare regime, welfare redistribution.

j Views on welfare state, gender equality.

Table 1b: Public Opinion on European Integration: Key Non-economic Models

	Anderson's national proxies model (1998)	Rohrschneider's democratic performance model (2002)	Steenbergen and Jones' party cue model (2002)	McLaren's cultural threat model (2002)	Carey's identity model (2002)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Membership</i>	<i>3 items tapping support for EU government^c</i>	<i>Membership + desired speed</i>	<i>Membership + benefit</i>	<i>Membership</i>
<i>Cognitive factors</i>			Opinion leadership		Opinion leadership
<i>Egocentric economic factors</i>	Evaluation of personal economy	Evaluation of personal economy		Occupation, income, educa- tion, proximity to border	Occupation, income, educa- tion; evaluation of personal economy
<i>Sociotropic economic factors</i>	Evaluation of national economy	Evaluation: single market, national economy		Perceived economic threat ^e	Evaluation of national economy
<i>Political factors</i>	System support ^a , government support, party support ^b	Perceptions EU representation, satisfaction EU democracy	party cue ^d		
<i>Ideology/ political values</i>		Post-materialism		Left/right self- placement	
<i>Cultural threat</i>				Perceived cultural threat ^f	Perceived cultural threat ^g
<i>Identity</i>					National pride ^h , territorial attachment ⁱ
<i>Other</i>					
<i>Country dummies</i>	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
<i>Method</i>	OLS	OLS, MLA	MLA	OLS	ordered LOGIT
<i>R²</i>	.09–.20 (nat)	.23–.40 (nat)	CALCULATE (EU)	.17–.21 (EU)	59% correct (EU)

a Satisfaction with national democracy.

b Voted for establishment party.

c (1) EU government responsible to EU Parliament? (2) More power for EP good/bad? (3) EP more/less important role?

d Level of EU support among political parties, constituting a cue to party supporters.

e Minorities abuse social benefits.

f Religious practices of minorities threaten our way of life.

g EU threatens national identity; language.

h Interaction: national pride + exclusive national identity.

i Local, regional, national, European.

the cause of Euroskepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Taggart 1998). We detect a corresponding turn in the analysis of public opinion, and a greater sensitivity to the view, espoused by a scholar sympathetic to rational calculus, that, “Individual preferences are guided by both [pre]dispositions and incentives. This means that, in selecting between any set of alternatives, an individual may, by virtue of his group identifications and values, be predisposed to favor one alternative independently of the current incentives associated with the alternatives” (Chong 2000, 74; see also Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). In a longitudinal analysis of twenty-five years of EU public opinion, Bernhard Wessels concludes that, “the impact of stratifying characteristics—education and occupation—on attitudes towards the EC has declined,” while that of political values such as left/right, postmaterialism, and party identification has increased (Wessels 1995a, 135). Sean Carey’s ‘identity model’ (2002) elaborates different measures of regional, national and European identity, and finds that they powerfully structure EU public opinion. Lauren McLaren’s ‘cultural threat model’ demonstrates that “attitudes toward the European Union tend to be based in great part on a general hostility toward other cultures” (2002, 564).

Several models root public opinion towards European integration in the domestic political context. Anderson’s ‘national proxies model’ (1998), Carrubba (2001), Rohrschneider’s ‘democratic performance model’ (2002) and Steenbergen and Jones’ ‘party cue model’ (2002) all draw attention to national political-institutional variables, of which party support or party cue appear especially powerful.

Analysts have sought in different ways to handle the multi-level structure of the data. All are aware, of course, that public opinion varies across countries as well as across individuals. One approach is to run the same model for as many countries as there are in the data set (Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998). Another is to deal with one level only or with each level separately (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Bosch and Newton 1995; Carrubba 2001; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Wessels 1995a). A standard strategy is to absorb clustering of residuals by country in a series of dummy variables (e.g. Gabel 1998a). Such variables are sphinx-like in that they increase the variance explained by the model, but tell us little or nothing substantively. Finally, there are two analyses that, like the analysis of this paper, use multi-level analysis. Both are represented in Table 1.

Models that account for the most variance sometimes rely on independent variables that appear uncomfortably close to the dependent variable. Most writers, including those selected here, face up explicitly to the problem of establishing direction of causality. One may ask whether evaluations of the extent to which respondents feel represented by the

European Parliament influence support for European integration or result from it?³ Given the well-documented lack of knowledge of the European Parliament among most EU citizens, it seems possible that responses to a question about whether the European Parliament protects one's interests may issue from more diffuse attitudes, including those towards the European Union generally. Similarly, it seems strained to consider the perception of whether one's country has benefited from integration as an independent variable, especially because it is sometimes used together with membership as indicator for support. The authors listed in Table 1 have evidently thought through such concerns. In this paper we do not include European identity among our independent variables on the grounds that it plausibly results from, as well as contributes to, support for European integration.

2. Method and Data

Data for the dependent variable and the individual-level predictors come from Eurobarometer 54.1, for which fieldwork took place in the fifteen member states of the European Union in the Fall of 2000.⁴ We include only respondents for whom we have values on all variables in the full model, so that we have a common base of reference for evaluating our consecutive explanatory models.⁵ Our measures for the dependent variable and the predictors are described in Table 2.

To measure support for European integration we combine three indicators that tap basic, complementary elements of support: principle of membership, desired speed of integration, and direction of future integration. Whether membership of the European Union is good, bad, or neither good nor bad is the most consistently asked question in Eurobarometer surveys since 1970. As Table 1 shows, it is also the most widely used dependent variable, despite the fact that it forces responses into three categories. More recently, Eurobarometer has added questions tapping respondent's views on the desired speed of European integration and on the desired importance of the European Union in one's daily life. The resulting index is more fine-grained than any of its constituent elements, and approximates a con-

3 To be fair, a large part of the problem has its roots in the survey instrument, and the difficulty researchers have in finding appropriate indicators of the concepts they wish to measure.

4 Harald Hartung. 2002. *Eurobarometer 54.1: Building Europe and the European Union. The European Parliament, Public Safety, and Defense Policy, November-December 2000*. Commission of the European Community. This dataset is available from Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. We exclude Luxembourg (N = 15,637).

5 This brings the number of cases to 7222. The largest reduction in cases is due to *Party Cue*. A fairly large number of respondents (6387) do not report which party they intend to vote for at the next general election, and we need this information to construct *Party Cue*. The second-largest reduction is due to *Left/Right* (3294). Our model is robust across the full sample and the restricted sample. No variable reported here shifts in sign or significance.

tinuous measure of the level of support for European integration. The results we report below are robust across these alternative measures of the dependent variable.

Table 2: Variable Descriptions

<i>Support for European integration</i>	An index of three items: (1) “Generally speaking, do you think that [our country’s] membership of the European Union is (a bad thing, neither good nor bad, a good thing)?”, (2) the desired speed of European integration (1 = integration should be brought to a “standstill”; 7 = integration should run “as fast as possible”), and (3) “In five years’ time, would you like the European Union to play (a less important role, same role, a more important role) in your daily life?” The correlation is 0.375 between (1) and (2), 0.420 between (1) and (3), and 0.470 between (2) and (3). Standardized item $\alpha = 0.687$. The index is recoded as a 0-100 thermometer scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for European integration.
<i>Education</i>	Measured by the age of respondents when they stopped full-time education (<i>D.8</i>), and recoded into a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (up to 15 year of age), to 2 (16-19 years old), 3 (20 years old or more) and 4 (still studying).
<i>Professional/Manager</i>	A dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates that respondent is professional (self-employed or employed), general manager, or business proprietor.
<i>Manual Worker</i>	A dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates that respondent is a skilled or unskilled manual worker, or non-desk employee (e.g. salesman, driver).
<i>Personal Economic Prospects</i>	An index of three items measuring respondents’ expectations (worse, same, better) concerning their future life, the financial situation in their household, and their job situation (<i>Q.501</i> , <i>Q503</i> , <i>Q505</i>). Correlations vary between 0.486 and 0.531; standardized item $\alpha = 0.722$. This 3-point variable is centered on the sample mean.
<i>National Economic Prospects</i>	An index of two items measuring respondents’ expectations (worse, same, better) concerning the economic situation and the employment situation in their country (<i>Q.502</i> , <i>Q504</i>). Correlation is 0.530. This 3-point variable is centered on the sample mean.
<i>Perceived Economic Threat</i>	Scores from two-factor analysis (principal components, varimax rotation assuming orthogonality) of responses to <i>Q.33</i> : “Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you personally are currently afraid of it, or not (currently afraid, don’t know, not currently afraid)?” Items with a score greater than 0.40 on this factor are: “Other countries joining the EU will cost too much money,” “Less subsidies from the European Union for [our country],” “Richer countries pay more for the others,” “More difficulties for [nationality] farmers,” and “The transfer of jobs to countries with higher production costs.” Scores on this variable vary between -2.699 and +2.035.
<i>Structural Funds</i>	Country receipts per capita from EU structural funds and cohesion policy (1994-1999 period; 1994 prices). The variable is centered on its mean. <i>Source</i> : http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/.....
<i>Type of Capitalism</i>	Categorization along a two-dimensional 2x3 table: type of national production system (liberal market economies, mixed systems, organized market economies—as defined by Hall and Soskice (2001)) and the extent of welfare redistribution (limited, medium, extensive—as measured by the Gini index after income taxation and social benefits.) <i>Source</i> : Gourevitch and Hawes (2001.) We allocate scores to countries depending on their distance from the median category (mixed systems, medium redistribution) whereby 2 is allocated to the median category, 1 to countries in adjacent cells, and 0 to countries two cells removed.
<i>Left/Right Ideology</i>	Self-placement on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right), and centered on the sample mean.

<i>Scand*Left/Right</i>	Interactive term between Left/Right Ideology and Scandinavia, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for respondents from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.
<i>Party Cue</i>	A measure of party support for European integration ranging from 1 (party leadership is strongly opposed) to 7 (party leadership is strongly in favor). <i>Source:</i> means for parties are calculated from 123 party expert evaluations of the positions of party leaderships on European integration in the fourteen largest member states; data collected by Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (http://www.unc.edu/~marks). Party means are matched with individual respondents who indicate which party they intend to vote for in the next general election (Eurobarometer 54.1, D.4). We center this 7-point variable on the sample mean.
<i>National Attachment</i>	An index of two items measuring the intensity of attachment to country (not at all attached, not very attached, fairly attached, very attached) (Q.803) and of national pride (not at all proud, not very proud, fairly proud, very proud) (Q.6). The index ranges from 1 (very weak national attachment) to 7 (very strong national attachment). Inter-item $r = 0.465$; standardized item $\alpha = 0.635$. We center this 7-point variable on the sample mean.
<i>Exclusive National Identity</i>	<i>Question Q.23:</i> “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only?” This 4-point variable is centered on the sample mean.
<i>Referendum* Exclusive National Identity</i>	An interactive term between Exclusive National Identity and Referendum, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for countries that had at least one referendum on European issues prior to 2001. <i>Source:</i> Hug (2002), Hug and Sciarini (2000); Leduc (2001).
<i>Multi-culturalism</i>	We use the following question (Q.399): “Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement ... ‘With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer (tend to disagree, don’t know, tend to agree).’” This 3-point variable is centered on the sample mean.
<i>Perceived Cultural Threat</i>	Scores from two-factor analysis (principal components, varimax rotation assuming orthogonality) of responses to Q.33 (see <i>Subjective Economic Security</i> above): “Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you personally are currently afraid of it, or not (currently afraid, don’t know, not currently afraid)?” Items that score higher than 0.40 on this factor are “The loss of our national identity and culture,” “Our language being used less and less,” “The end of [national currency],” and “The loss of social benefits.” Scores on this variable vary between -2.199 and +2.125.
<i>Opinion Leadership</i>	An index based on two variables that tap how often respondents discuss political matters with friends (Q.2), and how often they try to persuade friends, relatives, or fellow workers from their views (Q.3). The index ranges from 1 (very low) to 4 (very high opinion leadership). Inter-item $r = 0.331$. We reverse the 4-point scale and center on the sample mean. Our coding scheme replicates the <i>Mannheim Eurotrends barometer</i> .
<i>Knowledge</i>	An index of subjective (Q.14) and objective knowledge (Q.24, Q.32) of EU politics ranging from 1 (no knowledge) to 20 (perfect knowledge). Inter-item $r = 0.412$. This 20-point variable is centered on the sample mean.
<i>Age</i>	Respondent’s age (in years) (D.11).
<i>Gender</i>	Respondent’s gender (1 = male, 2 = female) (D.10).

Note: Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Eurobarometer 54.1. Q and D notations in brackets refer to the question codes in the Eurobarometer codebook.

The first set of variables in Table 2 operationalizes political economy hypotheses. The first three variables (education, professional/manager and manual worker) relate to cell one in Table 1. We operationalize subjective economic factors with *Personal Economic Prospects* (cell two) and with *National Economic Prospects* and *Perceived Economic Threat* (cell three). We have two country-level measures of objective national economic benefit (cell four). EU cohesion policy (*Structural Funds*) constitutes about one-third of the EU budget. The last round of negotiations took place in 1999, one year before the public opinion survey.⁶ *Type of Capitalism* is a rough measure of the institutional costs of national adaptation to EU policy for production regimes (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999) and social policy regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). The high correlation between these dimensions of capitalism makes it sensible to combine them in one index (Gourevitch and Hawes 2001).

We measure political cues with *Left/Right Ideology*, a variable that interacts *Left/Right Ideology* with *Scandinavia* (in the expectation that the positioning of left and right is distinctive in Scandinavian countries), and with *Party Cue*. The data for *Party Cue* were collected via an expert survey conducted in 1999 by the University of North Carolina Center for European Studies at Chapel Hill (<http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks>). This dataset contains information on the position on European integration for 125 political parties in fourteen member states (excluding Luxembourg), of which we use data for 114 parties.

We measure various aspects of identity. *National Attachment* and *Exclusive National Identity* are adapted from Marks (1999) and Carey (2002). In accord with our expectations about the role of referenda in fomenting opposition to European integration, we interact *Exclusive National Identity* with *Referendum*. *Multiculturalism* and *Perceived Cultural Threat* allow us to evaluate hypotheses linking the level of support for European integration to respondents' feelings concerning cultural diversity and cultural degradation.

Finally, we include four control variables. Consistent with prior work on support for European integration, we expect support to be greater among opinion leaders, respondents knowledgeable about European politics, men, and younger individuals.

3. Results

Which of these factors help us shed light on support for European integration? We employ multi-level analysis instead of standard regression analysis because we wish to probe variation not merely at the individual level, but also at the level of political parties and

6 This is the most commonly used indicator for national economic benefit, though some scholars employ overall budget returns, which are highly correlated with cohesion spending ($R = 0.96$).

countries. Our presumption is that political parties and countries are irreducible political contexts that interact with individual attributes to produce political effects. We must therefore account for variation across these contexts to explain variation among citizens. To the extent that individuals are clustered in parties and countries, they should not be regarded as independent units of analysis. Ignoring this is likely to bias estimates because residuals will co-vary across the higher-level groups. By specifying predictors for clustered data across the relevant clusters, one is less likely to misspecify parameters (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1999).

An empty ANOVA model (hereafter described as the base model) reveals significant clustering of support at the party and country level. Table 3 splices the total variance among individuals into discrete variance components. The individual level encompasses 78.6 percent of the variance across the sample; the party level encompasses 9.1 percent; and the country level 12.3 percent.

Table 4 presents multi-level estimates and OLS estimates for the variables described in Table 2. Each of the theories we discussed finds some support in our results. We see immediately that identity and cost/benefit calculations are complementary for understanding public opinion on European integration. Explanations that ignore one or the other under-value the two-sidedness of human motivation (Chong 2000; Hooghe 2002; Kinder 1998).

How well do these theories explain variance at each level? The first two columns in Table 4 present the full multi-level model, which accounts for 22.7 percent of the variance at the individual level, 92.6 percent of the variance at the party level and 91.2 percent of the variance at the country level.⁷ This is a large improvement over the base model. The reduction in chi-squared from the base to the full model is 2009, using 21 degrees of freedom, and far exceeds standard benchmarks of significance. The model captures the bulk of variance at the party and country level, and a sizeable chunk of variance across individual respondents. The total variance explained is 37.5 percent.⁸

7 Our results are robust across alternative operationalizations of our dependent variable. When we take responses to the membership question alone as our dependent variable, we explain 19.1 percent of variance at the individual level, 89.5 percent of the variance at the party level and 74.3 percent of the variance at the country level. The total variance explained is 29.8 percent. With the exception of *Type of Capitalism*, which loses significance in the full model, the pattern of (in)significance for all other variables remains the same.

8 The concept “explained variance” is well defined for our full model because it estimates fixed, not random, effects (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998, 115). This is one of the chief virtues of eschewing random effects. While model fit is likely to be weaker under fixed effects, for all but two variables, *Left/Right Ideology* and *Exclusive National Identity*, we do not have a prior expectation that coefficients will vary across countries or parties. We choose to model the contextual effects of these variables by creating interactive terms in a fixed effects model. For all other variables, we expect constants, but not coefficients, to vary across our higher level units. Hence, we gain clarity and simplicity at little cost by not fitting random slopes for variables across our higher-level units. Estimates produced by a random effects model can, however, be a useful diagnostic tool. For example, we use country coefficients for *Exclusive National Identity* produced in a random effects model as a dependent variable in a separate structural equations analysis.

Table 3: ANOVA (base model)

	Multilevel estimates	
	unstandardized coefficients	standard errors
<i>Fixed Effects</i>		
Constant	65.389***	2.764
<i>Variance Components</i>		
Country-Level	95.023**	40.533
Party-Level	70.657***	13.204
Individual-Level	608.168***	10.207
-2* Log Likelihood	67019	

Note: ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$.

Table 4: Support for European Integration


	Multilevel estimates		Regression estimates	
	unstandardized coefficients	standard errors	unstandardized coefficients	standard errors
<i>Constant (Fixed Effects)</i>	64.191***	(2.056)	65.856***	(1.740)
<i>National Identity (Fixed Effects)</i>				
National Attachment	1.721***	(0.241)	1.780***	(0.239)
Exclusive National Identity	-7.292***	(0.446)	-7.506***	(0.407)
Referendum*Exclusive National Identity	-2.963***	(0.463)	-2.905***	(0.184)
Multiculturalism	4.437***	(0.319)	4.405***	(0.320)
Perceived Cultural Threat	-4.456***	(0.272)	-4.557***	(0.272)
<i>Political Cues (Fixed Effects)</i>				
Party Cue	2.220***	(0.237)	2.313***	(0.180)
Left/Right Ideology	-0.374*	(0.161)	-0.429**	(0.144)
Scandinavia*Left/Right Ideology	1.638***	(0.334)	1.595***	(0.293)
<i>Political Economy (Fixed Effects)</i>				
Education	0.849**	(0.357)	0.547	(0.351)
Professional/Manager	0.902	(1.022)	0.722	(1.032)
Manual Worker	-0.638	(0.656)	-0.935	(0.662)
Structural Funds	7.344***	(1.336)	7.490***	(0.457)
Type of Capitalism	2.675**	(1.149)	2.310***	(0.398)
Personal Economic Prospects	2.898***	(0.646)	3.194***	(0.648)
National Economic Prospects	2.804***	(0.466)	2.602***	(0.465)
Perceived Economic Threat	-2.474***	(0.260)	-2.348***	(0.260)
<i>Control Variables (Fixed Effects)</i>				
Opinion Leadership	-0.006	(0.311)	0.157	(0.311)
Knowledge	0.514***	(0.079)	0.446***	(0.079)
Gender	-0.021	(0.019)	-0.034°	(0.019)
Age	-0.656	(0.532)	-0.887°	(0.536)
<i>Variance Components</i>				
Country-Level	8.272*	(3.930)		
Party-Level	5.248**	(2.049)		
Individual-Level	470.385***	(7.873)		
-2 x Log Likelihood	65010			
R^2			0.36	
Adjusted R^2			0.36	

Note: ° = $p < .10$, * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$.

The right-hand columns in Table 4 report OLS estimates and their standard errors. The signs of the OLS estimates are no different from the multi-level estimates. However, the standard errors for these OLS estimates do not take account of the clustering of observations at the party and country levels, and are therefore underestimated. The problem is most severe for variables that tap variance at the party and/or country level: *Referendum*Exclusive National Identity*, *Party Cue*, *Structural Funds*, and *Type of Capitalism*. There are also some differences in parameters. The parameter for *Education* becomes significant in multi-level analysis, while the parameters for *Gender* and *Age* become insignificant. In the remainder of this paper we report multi-level results.

Because the metrics for our independent variables vary, the relative size of their effects is not directly evident from Table 4. Figure 2 reveals how variation on ten independent variables translates into levels of support for European integration. The solid boxes encompass the inter-quartile range for each independent variable, and the whiskers encompass the 5th to the 95th percentiles, holding all other independent variables at their means. For example, an individual at the 25th percentile on *Referendum*Exclusive Nationalism* has a score of 62.3 on support for European integration, and an individual at the 75th percentile scores 70.3. The variables towards the left of Figure 2 have the largest effects across their interquartile range.

Figure 2: Effects of Independent Variables



National Identity

The most powerful variables in our model tap various aspects of national identity: *Referendum*Exclusive National Identity*, *Cultural Insecurity*, *Exclusive Nationalism*, and *Multiculturalism*. With respect to the base model, they explain 18.9 percent of variance at the individual level, 65.5 percent of country variance, and 58.1 percent of party variance across our sample (national identity model in Table 5).

The paradox that we identified earlier is starkly evident. The greater citizens' pride in and attachment to their nation, the greater is their support for European integration.⁹ The parameter for *National attachment* is significant and positive in our full model, as it is in the absence of controls. The simple correlation is 0.025, which is significant at the 0.05 level. The association is robust across countries, with the thought-provoking exceptions of Denmark and Britain (see below).¹⁰ We already know, as noted earlier, that *National Attachment* is positively associated with European attachment.¹¹ Caution is warranted in interpreting our results here, because *National Attachment* is slippery under alternative model specifications. If we add a measure of European attachment to the model—a somewhat dubious undertaking given its close causal proximity to support for European integration and its quite strong positive association (0.319) with *National attachment*—the sign for *National attachment* becomes negative. But we can say, cautiously but emphatically, that national attachment is *not* mutually exclusive with either European attachment or support for European integration.

This finding is consistent with research in social psychology and anthropology, which shows that individuals often choose to identify with several territorial communities simultaneously (Brewer 1993, 2001; Citrin and Sides forthcoming; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). As case study after case study has affirmed, it is possible, and not at all unusual, for citizens to have multiple identities—to feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European—at one and the same time (Llera 1993; Marks and Llamazares forthcoming; Melich 1986; on multiple identities in Belgium, see e.g. Billiet, Doutrelepon and Vandekeere 2000; Maddens, Beerten, Billiet 1994.)

Multiple identities in Europe are normal (Bruter forthcoming; Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Laffan 1996; Marks 1999; Risse forthcoming; Wallace 1990, 33). When asked directly about this in Fall 1992 (Eurobarometer 38), 62 percent of respondents considered

9 As we detail in Table 2, *National Attachment* sums responses to a question asking respondents how attached they are to their country, and a question asking respondents how proud they are of their country. Our results are robust across these components.

10 The association is also negative but insignificant at the .10 level for Sweden and for Spain.

11 Strong attachment to Europe goes hand in hand with strong attachment to one's country ($R = .319$), and this relationship is robust across countries, with one exception—Britain ($R = .020$, $p = .673$).

“a sense of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity,” while 23 percent envisage their “country’s identity disappearing over time if a European Union came about” (Marks 1999; Reif 1993). Moreover, comparing national and European attachment through the nineties, Citrin and Sides find that a dual sense of attachment increased from 46 percent in 1991 to 56 percent in 1999, while exclusive attachment to the nation decreased from 41 to 31 percent. They conclude that “even in an era in which perceptions of the European Union as successful seemed to decline, the tendency to identify with both nation and Europe increased” (Citrin and Sides forthcoming, 8-9). Marks (1999) argues that national identities are embedded or nested in, rather than antithetical to, European identity (see also van Kersbergen 2000; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Risse conceptualizes the relationship as akin to a marble cake in which multiple identities are meshed together rather than nested. While national, regional and local identities in Europe contain a fair dose of Europeanness, the meaning of European identity may vary profoundly across territorial contexts (Risse 2002). Whether one conceives of the relationship as embedded, nested or enmeshed, there is broad consensus that a strong sense of national identity is consistent with European identity and support for European integration.


This is a point of departure for understanding European integration, but we still need to examine the claim that national identity is, at the same time, a powerful brake on European integration. If national identity is Janus-faced, under what circumstances will it collide with European integration? We can gain some insight into this by looking more closely at the variable *Exclusive National Identity*. A virtue of this Eurobarometer question is that it compels respondents to place either European or national identity above the other, and separates those who say they think of themselves as “*only* British (or French, etc.)” from those who say they have some form of multiple identity.¹² Those who attest exclusive national identity are distinctive. Average support for European integration is just 52.2 on our thermometer scale for respondents who have exclusive national identity, but varies between 74.1 and 79.5 across the remaining categories. Were we to operationalize this variable as a simple dummy with exclusive nationalists in one category and the rest in the other, we would not appreciably weaken its power.

So *exclusive* national identity is key. But the effect of exclusive national identity on support for European integration varies sharply across countries. In some countries, citizens who have exclusive national identity are only slightly more Euroskeptic than those with multiple identities. In others, exclusive national identity is powerfully associated with Euroskepticism. In the UK, citizens with exclusive national identity have a level of support for European integration that is on average 32.4 points lower (on our 100 point scale) than

12 In our sample, 40.5 percent describe themselves as “national only,” 50.2 percent as “national and European,” 6.2 percent as “European and national,” and 3.1 percent as “European only.”

those with some kind of multiple identity. In Portugal, at the other extreme, the difference is 9.7 points. Figure 3 illustrates the varying power of exclusive national identity across countries by mapping the parameters for *Exclusive National Identity* for each country according to their deviation from the sample parameter (mean = -11.64). The steeper the slope (i.e. the further towards the left of the figure), the more *Exclusive National Identity* affects support for European integration; the flatter the slope, the weaker is its force. Thus, a unit change in *Exclusive National Identity* depresses support for European integration by 17.5 percent in the UK (± 2.5 percent), against by 6.3 percent in Portugal (± 2.4 percent).

Figure 3: Country Coefficients for Exclusive National Identity



How can one explain the differences illustrated in Figure 3? What is it about the country context that mobilizes – or dampens – the effect of exclusive national identity for support for European integration? Several authors explore the subtle ways in which national identity is framed and politically mobilized in relation to European integration (Bruter forthcoming; Buch and Hansen 2002; Carey 2002; Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller 1995; Hermann, Brewer, and Risse forthcoming; Kriesi et al. 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999; McAllister and Studlar 2000; McLaren 2001, 2002; Merlingen 2001; Risse 2001; Semetko, de Vreese, and Peter 2000; Usherwood 2002). We theorized above that EU referenda campaigns politicize national identity with respect to European integration because they facilitate the open expression of conflicts within and among political parties and because they lead to single-

issue anti-European protest movements. A variable designed to capture this is powerful under the controls we exert in our multi-level model (Table 4 and Figure 2). Countries that have had a referendum are starred in Figure 3. Countries where exclusive national identity has the greatest bite – i.e. those to the left in Figure 3 – tend to be those in which a referendum on European integration has taken place.


To probe further into the causal role of referenda, we need to relax the assumption that referenda are exogenous. Do they exert *independent* influence on the mobilization of exclusive nationalism against European integration, or are they part of a larger political process that both initiates referenda and mobilizes exclusive national identity against European integration?

Our answer is that both processes take place. Our expectations here are based on the literature on American public opinion (Druckman 2001; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Jennings 1992; Kinder 1998; Zaller 1992), the analysis of referendums in Europe (Buch and Hansen 2002; Cristin and Hug 2002; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Hug 2002; Hug and Sciarini 2000; Leduc 2001), and our own prior research on political parties and elite/public divides on European integration (Hooghe forthcoming; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Marks forthcoming.) They can be encapsulated in three statements. First, we expect elites, particularly party elites, to be decisive in shaping public opinion. The greater the divisions among elites and between elites and the public on European integration, the more exclusive national identity will be mobilized against European integration (on polarization effects in public opinion, see Zaller 1992, 97-117). Second, the greater intra-elite and elite/public divisions, the more governments come under pressure to hold referenda on European integration.¹³ Third, as we have argued above, we

13 With the exception of Ireland, and the partial exception of Austria and Denmark, referenda on European integration have taken place at the discretion of governments. Referenda on European integration in Ireland have been held under Article 46.2 which requires votes in both houses of its parliament followed by a referendum to amend the constitution. Article 43 of the Austrian constitution requires a referendum for legislation that amends the fundamental principles of the constitution. Government and opposition parties agreed that accession to the European Union constituted such an amendment. In Denmark, referenda are necessary for legislation involving any surrender of Danish sovereignty to an international body that does not receive the support of five-sixths of the Folketing (Article 20). Three of its five referenda on European integration have been so triggered. Most of the remaining referenda on European integration have been held to shunt decision making from the government to the public because the governing party was deeply split, or because the government went along with calls for a referendum in the face of public divisions. The 1975 accession referendum in the UK is an example of the former. It was an innovative piece of constitutional engineering to minimize the consequences of dissension in the leadership of the governing Labour Party. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, had made his career as a conciliator, and took the opportunity to shift the decision beyond his divided cabinet to the public, in the solid expectation that the vote would be positive. Since that time, the hope or threat of a referendum has hovered over debate in Britain on Economic and Monetary Union. The last two Danish referenda in 1998 on the Amsterdam Treaty and in 2000 on the Economic and Monetary Union are examples of the latter. All parties agreed that the issues would be submitted to a referendum even if they were approved by the five-sixths majority in the Danish Folketing. In the eyes of two observers, “this tradition [of holding a referendum on EU issues] is very often legitimized with reference to the divided population

expect referenda to have an independent institutional effect. The dynamics of a referendum campaign are usually harder to anticipate than those of an election campaign, and this is particularly the case when an issue does not involve a cleavage or ideological issue, and when parties line up in a non-traditional manner (Leduc 2001). Compared to general elections, this volatility weakens the control of mainstream party elites, which tend to be supportive of European integration, and lowers the threshold for extreme parties and single-issue groups that seek to frame the issue in terms of exclusive nationalism.¹⁴

Figure 4: What Explains the Power of Exclusive National Identity?



Legend:

*** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level.

Italicized figures are squared multiple correlations. Non-italicized figures are standardized regression weights estimated by full information maximum likelihood.

Relative fit index (Delta NFI) = 0.981.

N = 14.

The structural equations model in Figure 4 allows us to test these expectations. The dependent variable is the statistical power of *Exclusive National Identity* on *Support for European integration*, illustrated in Figure 3.¹⁵ Chiefly, we expect 1) the extent of political

and the many narrow 'yes' or 'no' majorities—the logic being that . . . major decisions cannot be made without consulting the voters” (Buch and Hansen 2002, 9).

14 The prototypical example of a referendum where extreme parties and single-issue groups almost defeated an issue notwithstanding broad support among the mainstream parties is the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994).

15 Our independent and intervening variables are drawn, for the measure of elite divisions, from the National Elites Survey (Spence 1997, available on http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/top); divisions among political parties, from the 1999 Marks and Steenbergen dataset on political party positions on European integration (available on <http://www.unc.edu/~marks>); elite/public

division on European integration in a country to affect whether there has been a referendum on the issue; 2) the experience of referenda to have an independent effect on support for European integration; and 3) the extent of political division in a country to have an independent effect on support for European integration. As one can see in Figure 4, these expectations lead us to draw seven arrows across five variables. The assumptions constraining the model are weak in the sense that they allow multiple causality, and this reduces the degrees of freedom to three. Nevertheless, we find that the model is broadly consistent with the data, except for two of the hypothesized effects, which are insignificant, but positive in sign. We can estimate the combined direct and indirect effect of each independent and intervening variable. The total standardized effect of elite/public division on the power of exclusive national identity is 0.68; that for elite divisions is 0.47; and that for party divisions is 0.35. The total standardized effect for referenda is 0.35. Together these variables account for four-fifths of the variance on our dependent variable.

To summarize: exclusive national identity is a powerful brake on support for European integration, and its power is greater in countries where political divisions on European integration run deeper. National identity is framed in national contexts by the mobilization of opposing views on European integration. Political events and discourse may—or, in some countries, may not—construe for individuals that national identity is contradictory with support for European integration. In short, national identity is profoundly shaped by politics.

Surprisingly for us at the beginning of our research, but surprising no longer, is that a similar contextual story can be told for perceived cultural and economic threat. The causal influence of *Perceived Cultural Threat* and *Perceived Economic Threat*, like *Exclusive National Identity*, varies widely across countries, and there is a common pattern of variation among the three. The country slopes for these variables are strongly correlated, with values from 0.89 to 0.95. Recall from Table 2 that we operationalize *Perceived Cultural Threat* and *Perceived Economic Threat* as orthogonal variables: at the individual level they are random with respect to each other. The pattern we see among countries is, then, *entirely* contextual, and it is little different from the one we investigated in Figures 3 and 4.

It is worth noting that the *effect* of perceived cultural and economic threat on support for European integration is unrelated to the absolute *level* of perceived threat. So while a larger proportion of Greeks show concern about the effects of European integration on their national identity and culture, language, or institutions, than do Swedes or Danes, Greeks translate these fears far less consistently into Euroskepticism than do Scandinavians. Similarly, perceptions of economic threat run deeper among Belgian, Dutch or Greek

divisions, from the “membership question” and the “benefit question” in Eurobarometer 54.1 and the National Elites Survey; referenda from Hug (2002) and Leduc (2001).

respondents than among Danes or Swedes; that is, more people fear that building Europe costs too much money, means less EU subsidies for their own country, makes things more difficult for farmers, means that richer countries pay more, and transfers jobs to other countries. Yet the *effect* of perceived economic threat on support for European integration is much less pronounced in the former than the latter countries.

One last question before we discuss our remaining results: Do individual attributes affect citizens' response to political divisions? Does the impact of these contextual factors vary across individuals, and if so, why? The answer is yes for the well-established reason that the greater an individual's political awareness, the more likely he or she is to pick up and process elite cues (Zaller 1992; Inglehart 1970a; Wessels 1995b). Individual political awareness, which we measure as *Knowledge* and *Opinion Leadership*, amplifies the effect of having a political referendum. In countries with a referendum, the gap in support between those with exclusive national identity and those with multiple identities widens with greater political awareness. Among the 25 percent least knowledgeable individuals, the difference is 17.7 percent, and it increases to 24.5 percent among the top quartile. In countries without a referendum, the gap remains a stable 17 percent. Moreover, Euroskepticism has a harder edge in referendum countries. While, in general, greater political awareness leads to higher support for European integration, this is not so among exclusive nationalists in referendum countries. They persist in their Euroskepticism: from 46.6 percent support on our 100-scale to 47.8 percent among the most knowledgeable. Euroskepticism among exclusive nationalists in non-referendum countries appears softer: support for European integration increases from 57.7 percent among the bottom 25 percent to 64.6 percent among the top quartile.¹⁶ Political divisions among elites encourage polarization among the politically aware.

We find support for Lauren McLaren's thesis that opposition to European integration taps deep-seated fears. Yet the connection of such emotions to European integration is not automatic. It is mobilized in political conflict. Exclusive national identity and cultural and economic fears are interpreted—**constructed**—in contrasting national contexts.

16 The results are similar for opinion leadership. In referendum countries, the gap between individuals with exclusive and multiple identity widens from 24.3 percent among the bottom quartile on opinion leadership to 30.7 percent among the top quartile, while in non-referendum countries it creeps up slightly from 16.2 percent to 18.4 percent. Euroskepticism deepens among exclusive nationalists in referendum countries—from 45.0 percent among the least politically aware down to 41.0 percent among the top quartile in opinion leadership. This contrasts with exclusive nationalists in non-referendum countries, where the respective figures are 60.0 percent and 64.1 percent.

Cues and Calculations

How do alternative explanations fare under the controls we exert? Table 5 estimates the marginal effects of three sets of variables for public opinion on European integration in the absence of controls and under full controls. The first column estimates the marginal reduction in the deviance when the variables associated with each model are introduced as the first variables in our base model. The second column estimates the marginal reduction in the deviance when these same variables are introduced in the presence of all other variables listed in Table 2. Columns three to eight estimate the effect of variables in each model in reducing variance at the national, party, and individual levels as a percentage of the total variance at each level in the sample. We do this both in our base model (i.e. under no controls) and in the full model (i.e. under full controls).

Table 5: Marginal effects

	Overall decrease in deviance ^a		Percentage decrease in variance ^b					
	base model	full model	at country level		at party level		at individual level	
	base model	full model	base model	full model	base model	full model	base model	full model
<i>National Identity Model</i>	1567	1176	65.5	23.4	58.1		18.9	13.3
<i>Political Cues Model</i>	119	83			80.1	30.0		
<i>Political Economy Model</i>	540	240	66.5	25.8	23.5		6.9	2.5

a Overall decrease in deviance ($-2 \times \log\text{-likelihood}$) when variables are introduced as the final variables in the base model (column 1) or as the first variables in the full model (column 2). Differences in the deviance between models follows a chi-squared distribution. The National Identity model uses 5 degrees of freedom; the Political Cues model uses 3 degrees of freedom; and the Political Economy model uses 8 degrees of freedom. All models improve the fit at levels of significance well beyond conventional yardsticks.

b Percentage decrease in the variance (as a proportion of the total variance in the base model) at the country, party, or individual level when variables are introduced as the final variables in the full model or as the first variables in the base model. Only significant estimates ($p < 0.01$) are reported.

The relative power of the five variables associated with national identity is evident in Table 5. A national identity model is almost three times more powerful in reducing the deviance in our sample than are the variables encompassed by the political economy model, at a cost of 5, as opposed to 8, degrees of freedom. When we estimate the marginal effects of these models under full controls, the superior power of the national identity model is starker. Both models are considerably more powerful than the three variables we group in a political cues model, though there is little doubt ($p < 0.001$) that the political cues model has a significant effect.

When we examine estimates of the effects of these models across the levels of our model, we gain a more finely-grained picture. The marginal effect of the political cues

model is strongest at the party level. Alone, it accounts for four-fifths of the variance at the party level, and it is the only model that accounts for a significant amount of additional variance under controls. The national identity model and the political economy model have similar, powerful, effects in reducing the variance in mean support for European integration among countries. The difference in the power of these models is mainly at the individual level, which as we see from Table 3, comprises 78.6 percent of the total variance in the sample.

Party cue is the single-most powerful predictor of variance at the party level, accounting for an additional 16.7 percent of the variance under full controls. Alone, this variable accounts for an estimated 74.1 percent of the variance at the party level. Party supporters tend to have positions on European integration that are close to those of their political party. Our data do not enable us to determine whether political parties follow their supporters, or supporters follow political parties, though there are good grounds for believing the latter (for contrasting arguments, see Steenbergen and Scott forthcoming; Carrubba 2001). We confirm Steenbergen and Jones' finding that the effect of party cueing is greater among more politically aware citizens (2002; Zaller 1992, 40-52). The estimated coefficient for party cue increases from 2.22 (s.e. = 0.24) to 3.62 (s.e. = 0.51) for those in the top ten percent.

We find evidence that public opinion on European integration is influenced by the self-placement of respondents on a left/right dimension. In general, those on the left are more favorably oriented to European integration. But the connection is weak. A shift of one unit to the left on the 1 to 10 left/right scale increases support for European integration by 0.37 percent, as evident in Table 4. This is in line with previous research (van der Eijk and Franklin forthcoming; Gabel 1998a, 1998b). As European integration has evolved from market-making to polity-making, so left and right have switched positions. But, as we expect, the effect of *Left/Right Ideology* varies across country. In Sweden, Finland and Denmark, those on the **right** are more positively disposed to European integration. In these countries, a one unit shift to the right increases support for European integration by 1.64 percent. An interactive variable, *Scandinavia*Left/Right Ideology* captures this effect. So, *Left/Right Ideology* is similar to *Exclusive National Identity* in that its effect depends on national context. This is consistent with recent comparative political economy literature which argues that the connection between left/right ideology and support for European integration depends on which type of capitalism is in place. In countries where social democratic and welfare institutions are particularly strong, European integration is likely to be interpreted as a drag on welfare spending. In countries, like Britain, where social democratic and welfare institutions are much weaker, European integration may have the

reverse effect.¹⁷ Hence, right-leaning citizens will take opposing positions on European integration in Britain and Scandinavia.

Variables in the political-economy model are potent in reducing country-level variance. *Structural Funding*, a measure of inter-country transfers in European cohesion policy, accounts for 23.9 percent of the country-level variance under controls. This confirms Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt (forthcoming) and Ray (forthcoming).

Type of Capitalism is significant but not very influential (see Figure 2). This is a surprise (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming; Ray forthcoming). Standard regression analysis underestimates the standard error for *Type of Capitalism* by a wide margin (compare columns two and four in Table 4). Perhaps we have mis-specified this hypothesis. There is little doubt that citizens in countries with different capitalist systems tend to have different views concerning the welfare state, the labor market, and the role of government in the economy (Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Lipset and Marks 2001). Furthermore, it is plausible that the preferences of governments and interest groups on EU policy are, in part, “a function of how [European] cooperation will affect the workings of [the] national market economy” (Fioretos 2001, 239). But the implications for public opinion on European integration are not self-evident. The indicator we use scores countries on their distance from the median EU country along dimensions: 1) type of national production system and 2) extent of welfare redistribution. This is defensible but not compelling. There are numerous ways to operationalize dichotomous and trichotomous variables to capture variation among 15 countries, and some may fit the data better than the measures we have chosen. The least we can say is that our measure is not defined with our data in mind.¹⁸

Political-economic factors do not reduce party-level variance very much, and they explain only an additional 3 percent or so variance at the individual level. This is not impressive given the emphasis in the literature on the economic costs and benefits of European integration. Three political-economic variables are significant in our analysis. As detailed above, the extent to which respondents’ perceive European integration as an economic threat strongly influences *Support*. Second, support for European integration drops by 8.7 percent for respondents who are pessimistic (vs. optimistic) about their personal

17 This was the fear of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who exclaimed in her Bruges speech in September 1988 that ‘we have not successfully rolled back the role of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level’ (Thatcher 1998, 49-54.)

18 More sophisticated measures would be helpful, for example, taking off from Iversen and Soskice’s theory of asset specificity. A plausible approach might parallel the one we have developed for national identity. One might investigate how particular country-level political-economic contexts (as measured, e.g., by Hall and Gingerich 2001) interact with group characteristics (e.g. low vs. high asset specificity), which are then mediated by individual-level characteristics (e.g. gender, income).

economic prospects. Third, support for European integration drops by 8.4 percent for respondents who are pessimistic (vs. optimistic) about their country's economic prospects.

4. Conclusion

Our findings challenge economic analyses of support for European integration, not because we find no support for them, but because we discover something far more potent: national identity.

This makes sense when we examine the course of European integration. European integration has proceeded by stages, each of which has shifted a limited number of competencies from national states to the European Union. The justification for such institutional engineering has, at every stage, been grounded in jurisdictional efficiency, in particular, internalizing spillovers and reaping economies of scale in policy delivery. The result is a system of multi-level governance in which authority is diffused across local, regional, national, and European governments. Constitutional engineering to reap efficiency gains is the backbone of functional, neofunctional, and intergovernmentalist conceptions of European integration.

The founders of the European Union went out of their way to avoid the issue of identity, in the belief that European integration was best hitched to pragmatic, mainly economic, concerns and to the unassailable argument that efficient public decision-making demanded larger jurisdictions than existed in even the largest West European states (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming). They hoped to deepen European identity as a by-product of integration that could be led by elites with the implicit consent of publics. However, the European Union has become far more than a means to reduce barriers to trade, or even, more broadly, a means to produce certain public goods for citizens in member states. It conveys European citizenship; it prints its own money; it holds elections across its entire territory for a directly elected legislature with the power to veto most legislation. In short, the European Union is a polity—a self-governing community with authority over those who live in its territory. As such it engages the territorial identities of citizens. It is no longer possible to conceive of identity as an inert outcome of integration. As European integration has moved along a broad policy front, and as one national competence after the other has come to be shared with EU institutions, so territorial identity has become an obvious constraint on support for the European Union.

In terms of the broader literature on attitude formation and political choice, our results offer a caution and, perhaps, a promising line of inquiry. The caution is that ideological contestation—summarized by the left/right dimension—only dominates where the bounda-

ries of the polity are accepted. Hence, we cannot generalize the findings of the literature on political conflict in the United States, focused on contestation about the scope of government activity, to situations where the territorial articulation of the polity is itself contested. Settled jurisdictional boundaries are the sine qua non of democratic class conflict. Seymour Martin Lipset's enormously influential conception of democratic class conflict rests on the presumption that the political community is given – which was a fair assumption for post-war western democracies. The democratic machinery of conflict resolution kicks in only where the political community is taken for granted. The end of ideology, as Lipset emphasized, applies specifically to the left/right divide. All bets are off when we are talking about conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries. Such conflicts engage, as evidenced in this paper, basic issues of identity. This is not to claim that economic interests, in their various guises, are absent. But it is to claim that the pursuit of economic interest is secondary to communal attachments in situations where the political community is itself at issue. Where they clash, identity often dominates economic interest. Territorial sources of coalition formation dominate ideological sources of coalition formation.

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